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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920148-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in concluding 
that the eyewitness identification of Mr. Ramirez was admissible? 
Although the trial judge's underlying 
factual findings are subject to a clearly 
erroneous standard of review, his conclusion as 
to "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law," 
which this Court reviews for correctness. 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); 
see also State v. Adams. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 
73 (Utah App. 1992). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States constitution provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside• No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated December 21, 1990, the State 
charged Defendant/Appellant Nicholas Garcia Ramirez with one count 
of Attempted Homicide and one count of Aggravated Robbery. 
R. 6-7. On April 9, 1991, the State amended the Information to 
charge Mr. Ramirez with one count of Aggravated Assault and one 
count of Aggravated Robbery. R. 8-9. 
On June 11, 1991, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress 
the eyewitness identification and a memorandum in support of that 
motion. R. 53-7. See Addendum A for copy of motion and memorandum. 
Following an evidentiary hearing and argument held on 
June 26 and 27, 1991, the trial judge denied the motion. See 
Addendum B for a copy of the transcript of the trial court's oral 
ruling. 
On February 14, 1992, pursuant to Rule 11(8), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Mr. Ramirez entered a plea of no contest to 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, with the recommendation 
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by the State that he be sentenced as a class A misdemeanor, given 
credit for time served, and released that day. R. 121-2. As part 
of that no contest plea, Mr. Ramirez reserved his right to appeal 
the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress identification. R. 99, 
121. 
The trial court followed the State's recommendation and 
sentenced Mr. Ramirez to a class A misdemeanor at the time of the 
change of plea. The trial court gave Mr. Ramirez credit for 
fourteen months time served and released him from custody. R. 126, 
107; see Judgment contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 1, 1990, Leslie Norwood was stabbed in an alley 
behind the Broadway Deli located at 200 West 300 South in Salt Lake 
City. R. 199. Mr. Norwood immediately approached a woman for help; 
she called an ambulance. R. 206. Shortly after, Mr. Norwood 
arrived at LDS Hospital; his blood alcohol level was .364. R. 173. 
The emergency room doctor who treated Mr. Norwood testified that 
Mr. Norwood smelled of alcohol and was in a stupor. R. 172-3. 
Although Mr. Norwood was responsive to pain, he was not responsive 
to verbal commands. R. 174. 
When the incident occurred, Mr. Norwood was walking through 
the Broadway Deli parking lot, in search of cigarettes and either 
food or liquor. R. 160, 204. Mr. Norwood was hung over from 
drinking the night before but testified that he did not drink any 
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alcohol that morning. R. 220. He also claimed that he was not 
drunk that morning. R. 234. 
Mr. Norwood did acknowledge that he did not feel very well, 
had a headache, was sick to his stomach, and had dry heaves. 
R. 223, 229. Although he felt badly and claimed to be in search of 
food, he walked right past the Broadway Deli, which had food. 
R. 223. 
As Mr. Norwood cut through an alley, he "got jumped" and 
was stabbed. R. 205. He was "jumped" just as he was approaching a 
guardrail which he intended to go over. R. 222. He was surprised 
when he got "jumped." R. 242. 
The first thing Mr. Norwood saw or felt was a fist which he 
felt hitting his head. R. 240. The person who hit him was the same 
person who stabbed him. R. 205. Although that person's face was 
about eight inches from Mr. Norwood's face, Mr. Norwood could not 
see the person who hit him in the head. R. 240. 
Mr. Norwood also saw the knife blade and the hand that was 
holding the knife. R. 245. There was nothing unusual about the 
right hand that he saw. R. 245. Appellant has tattoos on his right 
hand which include a black cross which is two inches by one inch and 
a half-inch cross between his thumb and forefinger. R. 120. 
The assailant got Mr. Norwood "broadside" and stabbed him. 
R. 205. The perpetrator took eight dollars that Mr. Norwood had 
gotten from donating plasma or from his "partner." R. 205. 
Mr. Norwood testified that at the time of the stabbing, he said 
"Chico, you are stabbing me." R. 205. 
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Mr. Norwood believed that his assailant was "Chico/1 a man 
he had seen briefly sometime during the previous couple days. 
R. 211. On the night he met "Chico," Mr. Norwood and his "partner" 
were camping in a vacant lot where a number of homeless people slept 
at night. R. 211-2, 200-01. The pair had been drinking vodka, and 
Mr. Norwood was tired. R. 202-03, 212, 216. It was dark, and the 
only light in the field came from a nearby fire. R. 200-01, 213. 
Mr. Norwood crawled into his sleeping bag, preparing to go 
to sleep, when a woman named Michelle approached with a man named 
"Chico." R. 202-3, 211-12. The woman introduced "Chico," and 
Mr. Norwood claimed to have looked closely at "Chico" because he did 
not know "Chico" and wanted to make sure there was no trouble. 
R. 203, 214. "Chico" and Mr. Norwood did not shake hands or talk. 
R. 203. 
Mr. Norwood saw "Chico" for only a few seconds. R. 217. 
He was tired, so he lay down and fell asleep right away. R. 216-17. 
Mr. Norwood cannot write and had trouble drawing a map or 
pointing out accurately where things were located in the area where 
the incident occurred. R. 224-27. Because of his drinking, he also 
has a hard time keeping track of money and did not know where five 
of the eight dollars he had received from giving plasma had gone. 
R. 232. 
Detective Mendez interviewed Mr. Norwood for the first time 
several days after the incident. R. 207, 249. Mr. Norwood 
described his assailant as being a little shorter than Mr. Norwood, 
who is 5'10" tall. R. 207, 235, 251. Mr. Norwood gave a weight of 
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160 to 170 pounds. R. 251. Mr. Norwood said that the assailant had 
a heavy Mexican accent. R. 254. 
Dennis Couch testified that Mr. Ramirez does not have a 
strong Mexican accent. R. 247-47a. Appellant is 5'2". R. 244. 
Detective Howell first interviewed Mr. Norwood on 
December 10, 1990 as the pair drove to places where transients 
congregate, looking for the assailant. R. 134. At that time, 
Mr. Norwood described the assailant as 5'5" tall; this contrasted 
with Mr. Norwood's initial statements that the robber was about 
5'9". R. 147-8. Mr. Norwood described the weight as 130 to 140 
pounds. R. 148. 
The robber was a dark-haired Hispanic with a mustache; 
Mr. Norwood is not Hispanic. R. 148. Mr. Norwood did not describe 
any marks, tattoos or scars. R. 149. He also did not describe 
hairline or facial features. R. 146. Mr. Norwood thought the 
robber was thirty years old. R. 149. Mr. Ramirez is forty-one 
years old. R. 06. 
On December 20, 1990, police arrested Mr. Ramirez in this 
case. The probable cause statement in the Information filed on 
December 21, 1990 stated that "Leslie Norwood has identified the 
defendant as the individual who stabbed him . . . ." (emphasis 
added) R. 7. 
Mr. Norwood had not selected Mr. Ramirez from a photo 
spread, lineup, showup, or any other identification proceeding at 
the time the Information was filed; nor had officers held any such 
proceedings in which Mr. Ramirez or his picture were involved. 
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R. 138. This statement was apparently included in the Information 
because Mr. Norwood believed that "Chico" was his assailant and 
officers decided that Mr. Ramirez was "Chico". R. 155-6. 
Officer Howell did eventually show Mr. Norwood a photo 
spread which did not contain Appellant's picture. R. 137, 151. 
Although Mr. Norwood had met Detective Howell on several occasions 
and claimed that he knew who Detective Howell was, Mr. Norwood could 
not remember who had shown him the photo spread or whether such 
person was male or female. R. 235-6. 
Other than being Hispanic males, the men in the photo 
spread did not appear similar to Appellant. See State's Exhibit 1, 
Defendant's Exhibit 3. None of the men had receding hairlines. 
Id. One of the men was over six feet tall, and apparently only one 
of the men pictured was less than 5'5". R. 153. 
Mr. Norwood indicated that the photograph in the lower 
right-hand corner of the photo spread looked like his assailant but 
did not make a positive identification. R. 208, 237. The 
individual in the lower right-hand corner had a full head of black 
curly hair; Appellant had short, straight hair with a receding 
hairline. State's Exhibit 3; Defendant's Exhibit 1. Several days 
after the incident, Detective Howell believed that one of the 
individuals in this photo spread was "Chico." R. 151, 153. 
On January 30, 1991, Detective Howell transported 
Mr. Ramirez to the courtroom where a preliminary hearing was being 
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held on another charge against Mr. Ramirez.1 The State had 
subpoenaed Mr. Norwood for this hearing. R. 154. 
Detective Howell had told Mr. Norwood that they had gotten 
the man who had stabbed him. R. 237. Although Mr. Norwood did not 
believe that Detective Howell was present, Detective Howell 
testified that Mr. Norwood was with him and told him something of 
import. R. 141-2, 144, 145, 209. Mr. Norwood testified that he did 
tell Detective Howell later, at a lineup, that he had seen his 
assailant while at the preliminary hearing. R. 210. Although 
Mr. Norwood had repeated interactions with Officer Howell and knew 
who he was, Mr. Norwood claimed that he did not talk to 
Detective Howell on the day of the preliminary hearing. R. 236-7, 
239. 
Mr. Ramirez was the only man in jail clothing and shackles 
at the hearing where Mr. Norwood made his initial "identification." 
R. 238-9. After the preliminary hearing, two lineups were held. 
R. 142. The first was a "blind" lineup which did not include 
Mr. Ramirez. R. 143. Detective Howell told Mr. Norwood that the 
assailant may or may not be present. Mr. Norwood selected 
Mr. Ramirez from the second lineup. R. 143. 
Dr. Bryan Finkle gave expert testimony regarding the effect 
of a .364 blood alcohol level on an individual's cognitive 
abilities. R. 184. He testified that such blood alcohol level is 
extremely high and that an individual would have to drink excessive 
1. Mr. Ramirez was subsequently acquitted by a jury on this other 
charge. 
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in liinjii,,, fiIt i if alcohol on a routine basis for a number of years In order 
to be able to tolerate that amount u1 .*!< nhcl mrl r^najn standing. 
Finkle pointed out that anyone with such a high level 
system would suffer severe impairment of his 
mental abilities regardless or whether he cal 
disabilities K, 1Hh 
i nl'11 It;--J if iie-ij further that memory is severely 
impaired by alcohol and that people who drink excess 
memory blackouts He also testified that people reach 
t h e^ r m a x^ m u m |;> nywhere from 4 5 to 90 minutes 
after their last drink. Had Mr. Norwood stopped ilir uniiing 
ninety minutes or longer before the incident, his blood alcohol 
level would have there! oi:e hirn c>v<sn 11 i q 11 * -1 • than the recorded .364. 
R 190. 
Dr. David Dodd gave expert testimony on memory processes. 
He testified that when one i". mullet r» K 1 r < • tuc^, llil'e threatening 
stress, observations are likely to be distorted. R 2 ; 2 
Observations made after significant amounts of alcohol are consumed 
are also distorted. He Inubl i?i.l thi.it, Mi. I w o u l d 
able to adequately observe and process the face of "Chico" under the 
circumstances ai uhe camp a night or two before the stabbing. 
R • 2 7 5 
Dodd also testified that the description given closer 
in, t iiiiif!" ii'iii1 idpinit w.ns i i k e t y t o b e more a c c u r a t e t h a n t h e 
d e s c r i p t i o n given la ter , l< ..! 7 7 .Suggest ib i l i ty , viuuh <n. L.IT i IIJ a 
single suspect in the courtroom in jail clothing, can cause an 
individual to select that person. R. 278-9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
All five of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), for determining whether admission of an 
eyewitness identification procedure violates the Utah constitution 
weigh against admission. 
Not only did the witness lack the capacity to observe the 
perpetrator because of his extremely high blood alcohol level of 
.364, he also acknowledged that he did not in fact see the person. 
This alone should preclude admission of the identification. 
In addition, however, Mr. Norwood had little opportunity to 
observe the assailant. Mr. Norwood's attention was focused on the 
hand and weapon rather than the face of the person. Mr. Norwood did 
not describe tattoos on the hand; Appellant has tattoos. 
Mr. Norwood's description changed significantly over time as he had 
successive contact with the investigating officers; his initial 
description did not fit Appellant. 
Finally, the showup identification after the officer told 
Mr. Norwood that they had arrested the perpetrator was unduly 
suggestive. 
The admission of the identification also violated due 
process under the federal constitution. The procedure was unduly 
suggestive, and the five Biaaers factors weigh against admission. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION VIOLATED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Tin1 fd i I ilul ml y i*if eyewitness identification is well 
documented in various studies and utah case law, See state v. Long, 
721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 
Eyewitness Testimony; Civil 
and Criminal. - In Long, d M 4HH, the supreme 
Court stated: 
The literature is replete with empirical studies 
documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification. (citations omitted). There is 
no significant division of opinion on the issue. 
The studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that human perception is inexact and that human 
memory is both limited and fallible. 
(emphasis added). 
Despite the acknowledged unreliability of eyewitness 
identification, jurors give tremendous Wfiqlit In {.-null li-^l imony 
criminal trials. Loftus and Doyle at 24 5; Long. 721 P.2d at 490. 
in Ij.uruj I lnj four I recognized that eyewitness 
identification involves three memory processes 
information, the retention « information, and the retrieval of such 
information. L.ori'1, • „l" 1 P.2a at 490; see also The Court 
also recognized that the memory process 
each stage. 
Norwood's ability to acquire 
information,, to the identity of the assailant, his ability ti„ 
retain such information, and his ability to retrieve such 
information were subject to such great distortion that admission of 
his eyewitness identification of Appellant as the robber violated 
due process under both the state and federal constitutions. 
A, THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law." 
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted an analysis for eyewitness identification 
procedures under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution which 
differs from the federal analysis as set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 
409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). The Court based its divergence on 
scientific studies which demonstrate that eyewitness identification 
is often unreliable and which refute some of factors relied on in 
Biggers. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-780; see also State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
The Court determined that: 
The analytical model to be followed under 
article I, section 7 of the Utah constitution is 
structured around the criteria discussed in 
Long. The ultimate question to be determined is 
whether, under the totality of circumstances, the 
identification was reliable. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
The State has the burden of establishing that the evidence 
is constitutionally admissible. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. The 
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I:le\ i-i1.1 lii. I «.i s i determining whether an identification procedure 
violates the Utah constitution are: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree 
of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correct 
i ourt pointed out that "[a] finer analysis of these 
factors icluded in Long. 
Long. 721 *- analysis should be 
assistance to the bench and bar in applying these factors when EI 
challenge I;:o I, I, m? i orih I arises. " 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 
An issessment of the Ramirez/Long factors as they apply to 
the facts in the present case demons! i «itj * tli.t1 t hi:i * t i. -i I judge's 
ruling that Mr. Norwood's identification was admissible violates due 
pi:< J ; iess; u n d e r A r i i c h ' j „, S e c t i o n ' of the lit «:i11 c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
( I,) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event. This factor relates t the acquisition of 
icludes a consideration of 
a) the length ol tune I:, hi- ni i tnesset * *i 
the* actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and 
actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features 
were visible and undisguised; 
d) the light or lack of 1 i ght at the place 
ai id time of observation; 
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting 
noises or activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the 
witness' opportunity to observe the person 
committing the crime. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8. 
An analysis of Mr. Norwood's opportunity to view the actor 
demonstrates that the selection of Appellant as the assailant is 
unreliable. Mr. Norwood testified that he was approaching a 
guardrail which he intended to climb over when he "got jumped" and 
stabbed. R. 205, 222. The first thing he saw or felt was a fist 
hitting his head. R. 240. He was surprised. R. 242. 
Mr. Norwood acknowledged that during the course of these 
events, he did not see the person who hit him. R. 240.2 
Mr. Norwood's testimony establishes that he did not have the 
opportunity to observe the actor. The length of contact was short, 
the actor was not visible, and the surprise attack left Mr. Norwood 
only with the opportunity to see a hand and hear a voice. 
Mr. Norwood's opportunity to view the actor was not as 
strong as the opportunity of the witness in State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 782. In Ramirez, the witness was aware of and stared at the 
gunman; he described in detail the gunman's eyes. By contrast, 
Norwood never saw the face of his assailant. 
(2) The witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event. This factor as it applies to the present case 
also demonstrates the unreliability of this identification. 
2. Mr. Norwood did see a right hand holding a knife but apparently 
did not see the tattoos that Mr. Ramirez has on his right hand. 
R. 244-5, 249. 
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Although Mr. Norwood was aware of being jumped, *-- had no 
awareness immediately prion i HH-«I pto IJMI >I I T LHIH was about • 
occur. As previously outlined, he did not see the perse 
riiii" ii" MI,; M?i"i in i m 11 \\»»in • 
S c i e n t i f i c s t u d i e s ri I ibi it'in uu- t t'lit'e the existence of a 
phenomenon which has been labeled as "weapon focus ijoftus 
Doylfe Studies have shown that where a weapon is 
involved, the individual is likely I'u. In • I,I . i, 1 hij weapon, resulting 
1 f
 attention being paid other factors, including the face o 
perpe11; a f, ^  , Addendum C. 
Mr. Norwood's testimony suggest ^rienced 
"weapon focus" during this incident He was able • describe the 
blade of thr ' u i f i:i l-u1 I.. f ,...1 see his assailant # s face, K. 2 4 0, 
245. 
The application of this second factor to the instant case 
is also stronger 1 ' ,i? -,1, Ranu^e>j , ,i n Ramirez. the witness was 
"fully aware that a robbery was taking place" and h&iareo ^ '" i»^  
'^ jnnijn, trying to qet r\ good description,,f Ramirez . 817 P.2d at 
783. By contrast MI nni., urn iv--• • - ,:".i)» |»r i serJ and stared at the knife. 
(3) The witness ' s capacity to observe the event, including 
his or her physical or mental acuity. The capacity ' • observe 
includes stress anc , Jit (i«ji ,un<ii im »i n/ations « • prejudices, 
fatigue, and drugs alcohol consumed by the witness. 
i -* - factor demonstrates the overwhelming 
unreliability tit i is ("use,, 
- lb -
Mr. Norwood had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol. 
His blood alcohol level shortly after the event was .364. Unless he 
consumed alcohol within 45 to 90 minutes of being tested, his blood 
alcohol level would actually have been higher than .364 at the time 
of the event. R. 190. 
A blood alcohol level of .364 is more than four times the 
legal limit of .08 for driving an automobile. Dr. Finkle testified 
that an individual would have to drink large amounts of alcohol over 
a long period of time in order to be able to reach a blood alcohol 
level that high at a given time and still be conscious. R. 185. 
Dr. Finkle also testified that regardless of one's physical 
manifestations of the effect of the alcohol, an individual's 
cognitive abilities and ability to adequately assess and acquire 
information would be strongly affected by that amount of alcohol. 
R. 185. 
The emergency room doctor who treated Mr. Norwood testified 
that he was in a stupor. R. 173-4. 
Mr. Norwood testified that he was "hung over" at the time 
of the incident. R. 220. He did not feel well, had a headache, was 
sick to his stomach, and had dry heaves. R. 223, 229. 
Mr. Norwood's blood alcohol level and physical condition 
demonstrate that it is highly unlikely that he was able to 
accurately perceive the assailant. 
In addition, the extreme stress and surprise associated 
with a sudden attack and knifing may well preclude an individual 
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from accurately acquiring information as to the identification of 
the perpetrator. 
Dr. Dodd testified that when an individual is placed in an 
extremely stressful, life threatening situation, memory of the event 
and persons involved is likely to be distorted. R. 272. This 
testimony comports with scientific research which demonstrates that 
victims of extreme violence or traumatic events are likely to be 
unable to accurately perceive the events and also likely to have a 
distorted memory of what occurred. Loftus and Doyle, § 2.12 at 43-6. 
The overwhelming impact of this factor on Mr. Norwood's 
ability to perceive the event contrasts markedly with the 
application of this factor in Ramirez. Although the witness 
experienced a "heightened degree of stress" in Ramirez, "[a]side 
from the late hour and the injury from the pipe blow, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate Wilson was impaired by fatigue, 
injury, drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. By contrast, 
Mr. Norwood was ill from having consumed too much alcohol and was 
significantly impaired by alcohol. 
(4) Whether the witness'& identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was 
the product of suggestion. This factor relates to the 
suggestibility of the identification procedure and includes: 
a) the length of time that passed between 
the witness' original observation and his [her] 
identification of the defendant; 
b) the witness' [mental] capacity and state 
of mind at the time of the identification; 
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c) the witness' exposure to opinions, 
descriptions or identifications given by other 
witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, 
or to any other information or influence that may 
have affected the independence of his [her] 
identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of 
the actor that is inconsistent with the 
defendant's appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification. 
Long. 721 P.2d at 494-5 n.8. This last consideration should include 
a recognition that "an identification made by picking the defendant 
from a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than 
an identification made from the defendant being presented alone to 
the witness." Id. 
In the present case, an analysis of this fourth factor also 
demonstrates the unreliability of this identification. Mr. Norwood 
selected Appellant at the end of January, almost two months after 
the incident occurred. Although Mr. Norwood's mental capacity and 
state of mind at the time of the selection are not clear, the record 
demonstrates that Mr. Norwood is a chronic alcoholic; under such 
circumstances, alcohol use on the day of preliminary hearing is 
likely. 
Prior to the identification, Detective Howell told 
Mr. Norwood that they had arrested the person who attacked him, and 
Mr. Norwood apparently went to the preliminary hearing expecting to 
see that person. R. 237. 
Mr. Norwood's initial description of the assailant, given 
closer in time to the event and more likely to be accurate, is 
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inconsistent with Mr. Ramirez' appearance. Mr. Ramirez is 5'2". 
R. 244. This height is extremely short for a man and is apt to be 
one of the first things one would notice. Nevertheless, Mr. Norwood 
described a much larger assailant who was 5'9" or so. 
Mr. Norwood gave only a general description of his 
assailant; Mr. Norwood did not give a specific description of facial 
features or hairline. R. 146. 
Finally, the circumstances under which the identification 
was made were highly suggestive. Only one possible person, 
Mr. Ramirez in jail clothes, was available for Mr. Norwood's 
inspection. R. 238-9. Detective Howell had already told 
Mr. Norwood they had the robber. R. 237. Under such circumstances, 
pointing to Mr. Ramirez as the robber was highly unreliable.3 
This factor is also stronger in establishing unreliability 
in the instant case than in Ramirez. In Ramirez. the identification 
was made shortly after the event and there was no indication of 
witness impairment at the time of the identification. 
It should also be noted that in the probable cause 
statement in the Information, the State had indicated that 
3. It should be noted that at the time of the preliminary hearing, 
Mr. Ramirez was represented by court appointed counsel on this 
case. R. 03. Any formal eyewitness identification procedure in 
which Mr. Ramirez appeared, such as a lineup or showup proceeding, 
would have required notice to and presence of counsel. Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 
(1967). This identification proceeding violated Mr. Ramirez' sixth 
amendment right to counsel and requires suppression of the 
identification testimony. See Comm. v. Donovan. 467 N.E.2d 198 
(Mass. 1984). 
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Mr. Norwood had identified Mr. Ramirez. R. 07. Defense counsel 
appeared at the preliminary hearing on the other charge unaware that 
Mr. Norwood would be present and unaware that he had not identified 
Mr. Ramirez. The procedure utilized by the State in obtaining an 
identification violated Mr. Ramirez' right to counsel and due 
process. 
(5) The nature of the event being perceived and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This final factor also demonstrates the unreliability of 
this identification. 
As previously outlined, the extreme stress and weapon focus 
made it unlikely that Mr. Norwood would accurately perceive the 
event. 
Detective Howell drove Mr. Norwood around looking for the 
assailant. At that time, Mr. Norwood's description of the assailant 
changed from the description initially given to Detective Mendez. 
R. 147-8. It is reasonable to assume that this process impacted on 
Mr. Norwood's memory. 
Mr. Norwood and Appellant are of a different race. 
Mr. Norwood believed that his assailant was a male Hispanic. 
R. 148. He focused on the heavy Mexican accent of the robber. 
R. 254. Appellant does not have a heavy accent. R. 247-47a. This 
racial disparity is troubling and demonstrates the unreliability of 
the identification. 
This final factor is similar to that in Ramirez. In 
Ramirez. officers used a showup identification procedure with only 
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one suspect; officers indicated that they had apprehended someone 
who matched the description of one of the robbers. In the present 
case, the showup was at least as suggestive since only one 
individual was involved, he was dressed in jail clothing and seated 
at defense table, and the witness had been told that officers had 
arrested his assailant. 
In Ramirez, the Court found the "blatant suggestiveness of 
the showup . . . troublesome." Id. at 784. The Court pointed out 
that the case was "extremely close" and expressed concerns about the 
differences in racial characteristics between the witness and the 
defendant. However, because the identification "was based 
principally on the eyes, physical size, and clothing," the Court 
ultimately upheld the trial court's ruling that the identification 
was admissible. 
No such saving factors occur in this case. The witness did 
not observe the actor, and even if Mr. Norwood had seen the face of 
the assailant, Mr. Norwood's physical condition precluded him from 
making an accurate assessment. This lack of opportunity or ability 
to observe, coupled with the other factors set forth above, 
including the racial differences and "blatant suggestiveness" of the 
procedure, require that the identification be suppressed. 
Mr. Norwood grounded his determination that "Chico" was the 
assailant on a single meeting a night or two before the incident. 
Mr. Norwood's ability to recognize "Chico" after that short previous 
contact is also questionable. 
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Mr. Norwood had little opportunity to view "Chico" on that 
previous night and had an impaired capacity to observe. R. 211-2, 
202-03, 2116. Mr. Norwood was very tired when Chico approached his 
camp and was already in his sleeping bag. R. 203, 212, 216. He was 
so tired that he immediately fell asleep after "Chico11 approached 
his camp. R. 216-17. 
Mr. Norwood#s blood alcohol level on the night "Chico" came 
to the camp is unknown; however, Mr. Norwood acknowledged that he 
had been drinking vodka that night. R. 202-3, 212, 216. He viewed 
"Chico" for only a few seconds and did not shake hands or talk with 
him. R. 203, 217. 
It was dark when "Chico" went to the camp. A campfire 
provided the only illumination of "Chico's" face. R. 200-01, 213. 
Although Mr. Norwood claimed to have looked closely at 
Chico to make sure there was no trouble, there appears to have been 
nothing unusual about this event, and nothing that made it stand out 
in any way from other brief encounters Mr. Norwood had with people 
at the camp. In fact, Mr. Norwood's description of the short 
duration of the contact suggests that his contact with Chico was 
innocuous and unlikely to stand out in his memory. 
The circumstances under which Mr. Norwood "met" "Chico" 
suggest that he would be unable to process that face and later 
identify the person who was with Michelle. Those circumstances, 
coupled with the overwhelming unreliability of any identification of 
the perpetrator, establish that admission of Mr. Norwood's 
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eyewitness identification testimony violated due process under 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution. 
B. THE ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION VIOLATED THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The fourteenth amendment due process clause precludes the 
admission of identification testimony which is obtained through 
suggestive and unreliable means. An analysis of the admissibility 
of eyewitness identification testimony involves a two-prong approach 
under the federal constitution. Adams. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73. 
First, the court must determine whether the 
identification procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive so as to give rise to the possibility 
of irreparable misidentification. Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 
381-82 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377, 383-84, 88 S.Ct. 967, 970-71 (1968); 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 
1967, 1972 (1967). 
Second, the court must determine "whether 
under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was reliable." Biggers, 409 U.S. 
at 199;, 93 S.Ct. at 382; see also Mason v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253 
(1977) . 
Although aspects of the Biggers test have been criticized 
(see Long, 721 P.2d at 491-2; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-81), those 
factors continue to be considered in determining the admissibility 
of an eyewitness identification under the federal constitution.4 
The Biggers factors are: 
4. The better approach under a federal analysis would be to 
disregard the criticized factors, especially "the level of 
certainty," and analyze the identification procedure under the 
remaining factors. See Appellants brief in State v. Livio Ramirez. 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 880425. 
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1. The opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime; 
2. The witness's degree of attention; 
3. The accuracy of the witness's prior 
description of the criminal; 
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by 
the witness at the confrontation; and 
5. The length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. 
In the present case, as set forth supra at 18-19, the 
identification procedure was unduly suggestive since Mr. Norwood was 
informed that officers had arrested the robber and then was shown a 
single individual in jail clothing. The first prong under Biggers 
weighs against admitting the identification testimony. 
An analysis of the five Biggers factors also weighs against 
admissibility. As set forth supra at 14, Mr. Norwood did not have 
an opportunity to view his assailant and did not see the person who 
attacked him. Nor was he paying much attention to the face of the 
perpetrator, focusing instead on the weapon. See discussion supra 
at 15. He was extremely intoxicated and very ill, thereby impairing 
his ability to process information as to the identity of his 
assailant. See discussion supra at 15-17. The first two factors of 
the Biggers test weigh against admitting the identification 
testimony. 
Mr. Norwood's description of the robber changed over time. 
His initial description did not fit Appellant; Mr. Norwood described 
a significantly larger individual. See discussion supra at 19-20. 
The third Biggers factor weighs against admitting the evidence. 
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The fourth factor, level of certainty, has been much 
criticized. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490. 
Given the abundance of scientific studies indicating that an 
individual's level of certainty in making an identification has no 
bearing on the accuracy of an identification, this Court should 
disregard this factor in making the Biaaers analysis. The rationale 
for disregarding this factor is discussed in detail in Appellant's 
opening brief in State v. Livio Ramirez. Utah Supreme Court Case No. 
880425. 
However, even if this factor is considered, the 
circumstances of this case indicate that this fourth factor is 
neutral. Although Mr. Norwood seemed fairly certain that Chico 
robbed him, his level of certainty that Appellant is Chico is 
unclear; perhaps because this factor has been so criticized, no one 
asked Mr. Norwood his level of certainty. 
The fifth factor, the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation, weighs in favor of suppression. Almost two 
months passed between the incident and the preliminary hearing on 
the other case. R. 6, 154. This is a significant amount of time 
which would allow distortion in both the retention and retrieval 
phases of Mr. Norwood's memory. 
The Biaaers factors coupled with the "corruptive effect" of 
the identification procedure establish that admission of the 
eyewitness identification in this case violates federal due process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Nicholas Ramirez respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial judge's order denying his motion 
to suppress eyewitness identification and reverse his conviction and 
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ^LOtL day of July, 1992. 
<M^-CCJMC 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
2 ^ 
A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for DeCendant/AppeJ-lant 
VERNICE/S. AH CHING 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
^"^ IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. <f//<JC?GSSQL 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
COMES NOW Defendant, NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ, by and through 
counsel, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN and VERNICE S. AH CHING, to move this 
Court to suppress his identification on the grounds that the initial 
identification procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification and that the initial identification 
tainted subsequent identifications. 
Any introduction of eyewitness identification at trial 
would violate Nicholas Ramirez's right to due process of law under 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution because the 
identification was unreliable. State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^>I day of May, 1991. 
x^^ H^TlZABETH A./k0ftMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
VERNICE S/ AH CHING / " 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above-
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the day 
of f^l ( A I?; , 1991, a t the hour of ^? 'tf<0 A.m. before the 7 
Honoraible Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge. Please 
urselves accordingly. 
DATED this ^ i day of May, 1991. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of May, 1991. 
DELIVERED BY 
J UN * 11991 
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ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN (#4276) 
VERNICE S. AH CHING (#5243) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
DISTPlCf COURf 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 911900177 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. The burden of 
demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the 
prosecution. The State must lay the foundation upon which the trial 
court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach 
necessary legal conclusions. State v. Ramirez. 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 
10, 12 (Utah 1991). 
The court must then determine whether the evidence is 
constitutionally admissible. State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 at 463 
00056 
(Utah 1988). If the evidence is admissible, it may be presented to 
the jury. The court should not sidestep its responsibility by 
leaving the matter to the "whim of a jury." Ramirez at 13. Utah's 
Supreme Court is particularly concerned about careful scrutiny of 
the evidence on eyewitness identification prior to allowing the jury 
to hear the matter "because of the probability that such evidence 
even though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on the 
jury." Ramirez at 13 citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 
1986). 
The federal approach requires a determination by the court, 
considering "all the circumstances" of whether the identification is 
sufficiently reliable such that admission of the evidence will not 
deny the defendant due process. Five factors cited in Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 at 199, credited with being important are: 
the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' 
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' 
prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation. 
Id. 
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court departed from 
the federal analysis in part because of finding little or no 
scientific support for the factors. 
MKW7 
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Under the Utah Constitution, the test is whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. 
Those factors were listed in State v. Long: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree 
of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors 
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the 
mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 493. 
The third factor is whether the witness had the capacity to 
observe the actor during the event and includes the issue of 
impairment. In the instant case, Dr. Cameron Schaeffer will testify 
that Leslie Norwood, the alleged victim, had a blood alcohol content 
of .364 immediately following the stabbing. Mr. Norwood testified 
at the preliminary hearing that he had last consumed alcohol the 
night before, so his blood alcohol level would have been higher at 
the time of the incident. An alcohol level four and one-half times 
higher than the presumptive value for impairment (.08) undoubtedly 
would affect Mr. Norwood's perception. He was first interviewed 
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December 6, 1990, five days after the event. Mr. Norwood described 
the assailant as 5'8" to 5'9", 170 to 180 pounds, with a strong 
hispanic accent who had the name of Chico. He gave no description 
of facial hair, tatoos, or clothing worn. 
In a photo spread consisting of four hispanic males 
believed to be in the area at the time of the stabbing, Mr. Norwood 
tentatively identified Juan Blanco, who was 5'5" and 155 pounds and 
who had a thin mustache and a full head of hair. Officer Howell's 
perception of Norwood's response to the photo spread was "Juan 
Blanco is probably Chico.w Mr. Norwood was never shown a photo 
spread which included Mr. Ramirez. 
On January 30, 1991, Leslie Norwood was brought to court. 
Mr. Ramirez was seated at defense counsel's table on another 
unrelated case. Mr. Ramirez was the only person in custody and in 
jail clothing in the room at the time and was then identified by 
Mr. Norwood for the first time, two months after the crime. 
Two lawyers observed the stabbing—Victor Schwartz and 
Keith Pope. Both lawyers thought the assailant was close in height 
to the victim (5'10lf) or perhaps a little shorter (5'8M to 5'9") . 
Mr. Pope could not describe any of the assailants as hispanic. 
Mr. Ramirez, according to Officer Howell, is 5'2". Therefore, all 
the witnesses, including Leslie Norwood, describe someone other than 
Mr. Ramirez. 
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Finally, the court must address suggestibility, "whether 
the witness' identification was . . . the product of suggestion." 
Ramirez at 16 citing Long, 721 P.2d at 493. The blatant 
suggestiveness of the in-court showup denied Mr. Nicholas Ramirez 
his due process rights. Since the showup, Mr. Norwood has 
consistently pointed to Mr. Ramirez as the assailant. Before the 
showup, he neither described someone fitting Mr. Ramirez's 
description nor did he identify him from any photos. 
Mr. Ramirez asks this Court to suppress his identification 
under both the federal and state constitutions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *S>1 day of May, 1991. 
/''&£iZAB£TH A/^6WMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
rVERNjfcj^£. AH CHING 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Moeo 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing t o the County 
At torney ' s Of f i ce , 231 East 400 South, S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
t h i s day of May, 1991. DELIVERED BY 
JU:J * .1 1991 
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ADDENDUM B 
Di.r-6",'^ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ 
Defendant. 
E The motion nf S T A T E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•ZBIS 7 
in; 
50 4# '£• 
JUDGMEJtX.lSENTENCE';} TRICT 
(COMMITMEHTXJO "J'ITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JATfcr-^. 
Case No. 9 1 1 9 0 0 5 8 2 
Count No. 
Honorable HOMER K. WILKINSON 
Clerk AMY BAST IAN 
Reporter ED MIDGLEY 
Bailiff HARRY J . WILENSKI 
Date FEBRUARY 1 4 , 199? 
_ to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is EI granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;©plea 
of no contest; of the offense of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
a class A misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by 
B. BOWMAN & V . AHHHTNGflnH the State being represented by T . VTTYTT , j s 
now adjudged guilty of the above offense, 
89 is now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
IS of _ 1 2 _ _ months; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D 
D 
D 
GO 
K) 
• 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
DEFENDANT IS GRANTED HRFDTT FOR TTMF SFRVED (U 
are hereby dismissed. 
mos , ) 
THE GOTTRT ORDERS THAT THE DEFENDANT BE RFT.FASFD FROM TAIL FORTHWITH, 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 1 * day of FEBRUARY
 19_92 
/ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
1 ^ ' : " ' r ,r'-AT r H I : ' «S A TRUE COPY CF AN 
ORlGiNAt. DOCUMENT ON ?i|_'- !N THP THian 
OSSTniCT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. CTAlS ™ 
•J-s/ -7a 
TJTATI 
DATE 
TY. STATE OF . . 
Page -k of _ L 
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ADDENDUM C 
Factors Determining Perception §2.15 
people concentrate more on just a few features from their environment, 
and they consequently pay less attention to others. This selectivity of 
attention can be seen when people experience crimes involving weapons. 
§2.15 Weapon focus 
The term weapon focus refers to the concentration of a crime witness' 
attention on a weapon—the barrel of a gun or the blade of a knife—and 
the resultant reduction in ability to remember other details of the crime. 
Evidence of the existence of weapon focus stems primarily from two 
sources. In the traditional perception literature, there are experiments in 
which eye movements have been monitored while people observe com-
plex scenes. This work shows that people fixate faster, more often, and 
for longer durations on unusual or highly informative objects.38 It is gen-
erally agreed by eye movement researchers that eye fixation data provide 
a valid measure of where in a scene and to what an individual is 
attending. 
A second source of evidence for weapon focus stems from studies in 
which subject-witnesses watch simulated crimes. In one study, unsus-
pecting subjects sat outside an experimental laboratory waiting to partici-
pate in an experiment.39 A receptionist was there briefly and then left on 
some pretext. While waiting, subjects in the "no weapon" condition 
overheard an innocuous conversation about an equipment failure, saw a 
target individual enter the room holding a grease pen, watched him utter 
a single line and leave. In the "weapon" condition, subjects overheard a 
hostile conversation along with crashing objects, saw a target individual 
enter the room holding a bloodied letter opener, watched him utter a 
single line and leave. In both conditions, the target individual was 
viewed for four seconds. Subjects were later tested on their memory for 
the event. Nearly every subject in the weapon phase described some sort 
of weapon, whereas very few of the subjects in the no-weapon phase de-
scribed the comparable item. Moreover, the presence of the weapon was 
associated with a reduced ability to identify the target individual from a 
set of fifty photographs that were shown later. 
MLoftus & Mackworth, Cognitive Determinants of Fixation Location During Picture 
Viewing 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 
565 (1978). 
39
 C. Johnson & B. Scott, Eyewitness Testimony and Suspect Identification as a Function 
of Arousal, Sex of Witness, and Scheduling of Interrogation (Paper presented at the 
American Psychologial Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. 1976). 
51 
§2.15 Chapter 2 
This study left much to be desired as a test of the effects of the weapon 
because the two conditions differed in so many ways. In one condition, 
the target's hands were bloodied while in the other they were full of 
grease; in one a hostile conversation preceded the target's entrance into 
the reception room; whereas in the other, the conversations were innocu-
ous; the statement uttered by the target in the two conditions was also 
diflFerent. Thus, the study provides only suggestive evidence for weapon 
focus. 
More conclusive evidence comes from a study in which eye movements 
are monitored while subjects watch one of two versions of an event that 
begins with a customer going through a cafeteria line in a fast-food res-
taurant. In the weapon version, the customer points a gun at the cashier 
and she hands him some money. In the no weapon version, the customer 
hands the cashier a check and she returns some money. The events are 
identical except for the presence of the weapon in one case and the check 
in the other. Eye movements were recorded during the viewing of the 
event. 
The results of the study were clear. Subjects made more eye fixation 
on the weapon than on the check, and the eye fixations were of a longer 
duration than fixations on the check. Moreover, subjects who saw the 
weapon had poorer memory for other details of the event. They were 
also less able to recognize the "culprit" from a twelve-person array of 
photographs. 
Why does presence of a weapon lower memory performance? In a 
real-life crime situation, weapon focus would presumably be inextricably 
interwoven with high arousal caused by the crime itself and intensified by 
the presence of a weapon. The high stress itself could be expected to lead 
to a narrowing of the range of perceptual focus. In the studies of weapon 
focus, we have shown that such narrowing of perceptual focus can occur 
in response to a weapon, even when the events are not especially 
stressful.40 
§ 2.16 Chronic stress 
There is another kind of stress that is important to consider, a kind of 
general level of anxiety caused by stressful life events. This is diflFerent 
from the stress or anxiety produced by the crime or accident itself. Psy-
«°Loftus, Loftus & Messo, Some Facts About "Weapon Focus." 11 LAW & HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 55-62 (1987). 
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